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THE END OF THE WORLD NEWS
James E. Krier*
My title, but nothing else, owes to Anthony Burgess.' I like the
ambiguity of Burgess's words. They could be a play on what an anchor
says when she brings the night's news of the world to a close ("and that's
the end of.. ."), or they could be the name of a doomsday periodical, or
a headline announcing the bankruptcy of a tabloid, or, at the extreme, a
reference to the end of the world.
For my purposes, however, they signify the end of an era.
I
But speculation, however brilliantly it may be carried out, is at
best only a poor substitute for experience.2
How is environmental policy made? More to the point, what in-
forms it? I claim that, by and large, the answer to that question remains
today what it has been over the last twenty-five heady years, and what it
was before that. It is an answer I explained at length in an earlier study,3
and so I shall only briefly restate it here.
Policy of any kind happens, of course, for reasons (good or bad), but
reasons of various sorts, and reasons with differing influence. Political
expediency is a reason, and understanding of circumstances is a reason,
too. By understanding of circumstances I mean a collective vision of the
policy problem at hand, a shared or dominant notion of just what it is
that is wrong and needs to be fixed. Expediency, in my view, dictates
policy more than does understanding; but then, what is expedient is in
part a matter of what is understood (and vice versa), such that the two
blend together in ways that might often be indiscernible. So concentrate
just on understanding and consider how it is achieved. Once again we
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law, University of Michigan. My thanks to Steve
Croley for ongoing conversation about the general subject of this Essay, and for many helpful
comments on its penultimate draft.
I. ANTHONY BURGESS, THE END OF THE WORLD NEWS: AN ENTERTAINMENT (1983).
2. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 21 (1982).
3. See JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY
ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940-
1975 (1977). Chapter 14 of that work develops the larger theory. See id. at 251-307. For a
discussion focused particularly on my chief concern here-the production of knowledge useful
to the making of policy-see id. at 287-95.
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can think in terms of two rough categories, the first being speculation
and the second being experience.
In this context speculation means learning from study and theo-
rizing, with much reliance on models, technical experts, and scenarios
projecting one or another vision of some particular phenomenon. Expe-
rience, on the other hand, means learning from actual events--events
that even lay people can commonly understand. Like expediency and
understanding, speculation and experience also blend into each other
(events are studied); I claim, however, that in the making of policy, expe-
rience is much more salient and influential than speculation. In particu-
lar, it is usually experience that identifies problems in the world in the
first instance; beyond that, and more importantly, it is usually experience
that reveals shortcomings and misjudgments in our responses to the
problems in the world that were themselves first identified by experience.
Put another way, experience is more powerful than speculation in shap-
ing dominant notions of just what it is that is wrong and needs to fixed-
what is wrong, first, with (so to speak) the state of nature, and then what
is wrong, second, with our initial sense of what was wrong with the state
of nature and our initial judgment regarding what to do about it. And so
on, increment by increment. "Usually," says Schell, "people wait for
things to occur before trying to describe them."' Yes, and before trying
to control them as well.
Let me give a concrete example of the process I am talking about.'
Southern California "discovered" the air pollution problem in the
early 1940s in much the same way that other areas, such as London,
England, and Donora, Pennyslvania, had discovered their own air pollu-
tion problems some time before: The problem simply announced itself,
by way of a severe pollution episode. Yet notwithstanding the earlier
episodes elsewhere-episodes brought on in part by exactly the sort of
population growth and concentration that Los Angeles itself was sud-
denly experiencing in consequence of World War II-the appearance of
air pollution in Southern California was regarded as a mystery. The
problem in London and Donora was soft (dirty) coal, and soft coal had
not been used as a fuel in Los Angeles for fifty years.
But what about gasoline? Motor vehicle registrations in Southern
California had increased by fifty percent from 1930 to 1940, and vehicle
miles traveled annually had without question shot up much more. It did
not take a rocket scientist to figure out that there was a connection be-
4. SCHELL, supra note 2, at 21.
5. For an expanded account, see KRIER & URSIN, supra note 3.
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tween gasoline combustion and pollution. Besides, Southern California
had rocket scientists in abundance, scientists who as early as the mid-
1940s suspected that motor vehicles were an important part of the myste-
rious new smog problem. But any idea of pinning the problem on cars
was fiercely resisted by the public in general and the auto industry in
particular. It took fifteen years to get motor vehicle controls in place-
fifteen years of speculation, and fifteen years of experience.
Experience was the more important part, the better teacher, the
prime source of understanding, though scientific studies also contributed.
At the least, it was experience that validated studies and made them
credible. Speculation sometimes explained-whether before or after the
fact-what was happening, but it was the happenings themselves that
moved the policy process along, and in a very characteristic way. Gov-
ernment officials, under considerable pressure from an aroused public
and with no clear idea of exactly what else to do, attacked first the most
obvious (the most apparent, the most apparently obvious) and politically
vulnerable pollution sources, and then, failing that, the next, and the
next, each time learning by doing. Small step by small step, with each
step taken down the path of least resistance, it was not so much study as
action-commonly ill-informed action-that stripped away the uncer-
tainty surrounding the mystery of smog.
Consider, for example, that the initial reaction to the pollution epi-
sodes in Los Angeles was to put the entire blame on a single synthetic
rubber plant. The plant was a plausible candidate for one reason and one
reason alone-its emissions were visible-and closing it down did pro-
vide a useful piece of information: The plant was not the problem after
all, because the pollution continued without the plant. So enforcement
efforts turned to other stationary sources, focusing first on those that pro-
duced visible smoke emissions. Smoke (particulate pollution) had been a
problem on the East Coast, so perhaps it was a problem on the West
Coast as well; never mind that Los Angeles did not burn the coal that
everyone knew caused the smoke back East. Like a drunk searching
under a street light for the car keys lost elsewhere in the dark, pollution
officials looked where they could see-ironically, in this case, in the
smoke. And doing so, they once again learned something useful; not
what the problem was, but, as before, emphatically what it was not.
"[B]liack smoke and soot never were the real problem in this area. Re-
April 1994]
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moving them makes it more apparent that there is a serious air pollution
menace from invisible ... pollutants in the atmosphere." 6
By attacking "obvious" problems, the policy process gradually
stripped away some of the mystery of smog. The rubber plant was not
the cause, nor were visible smoke emissions. Nor, for all of that, were
sulfur oxides, the next candidate. These were invisible emissions, but "it
was only logical" to suspect them because they too "had been a very bad
actor during eastern smog."'7 So sulfur dioxide was attacked relentlessly,
to the point that total emissions of the pollutant in Los Angeles were
brought down to only a fraction of the amount produced in other cities
that werefree of pollution problems. But smog persisted in Los Angeles.
"It would appear," officials reported at the end of the exercise, "that the
only conclusion which can be drawn is that sulphur dioxide, as a pollu-
tant in the general atmosphere, is one of the least important contami-
nants in the Los Angeles smog."'
Speculation had suggested as much long before, but speculation was
not enough. The nature of the pollution problem in Southern Calfornia
was revealed by experience, not study, though study came to play a con-
siderable part. Officialsi finally realizing that they had a unique problem
on their hands, started a major research effort that promptly identified
the photochemistry of Los Angeles air pollution; an understanding of the
photochemical reaction in turn confirmed the role of hydrocarbons,
something that had been speculated about as early as 1945, if not before;
and the subsequent focus on hydrocarbons led, eventually, to control of
motor vehicles.
Not directly, of course; that would spoil the story. The initial hy-
drocarbon controls were aimed at emissions from stationary rather than
vehicular sources--despite the fact that the research mentioned above
implied the latter as an important contributor. But scientists differed
among themselves about the auto's role, some leaning one way and some
the other, and the general public was not eager to have its cars con-
trolled. Nor were the auto companies. They capitalized on the scientific
disagreement and the public resistance, asserting throughout-as tobacco
companies, to mention only a single instance, were later to do in a related
6. HAROLD W. KENNEDY, THE HISTORY, LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF
AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE COUNTY OF Los ANGELES: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF Los ANGELES 22 (1954) (emphasis added).
7. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 3, at 291 (quoting L. DuBridge, Summation of Confer-
ence, in PROCEEDINGS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CONFERENCE ON ELIMINATION OF AIR
POLLUTION 132 (1955)).
8. Id. (quoting CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION, FI-
NAL SUMMARY REPORT 25 (1952)).
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connection-that there was insufficient evidence to pin the blame on
cars.
Yet the passivity of the policy that resulted eventually provided
the best proof of all, proof that simply would not yield to scien-
tific attack or industry doubt-mongering. Smog conditions per-
sisted-indeed, they grew worse-yet every conceivable source
other than the automobile had been brought under control....
The conclusion was so obvious that even the industry re-
lented .... The auto companies caved in (though not without
qualification) by 1960. It had taken fifteen years of exfoliation
to demonstrate what science had suspected in 1943-47, con-
firmed in 1950, and considered conclusive in 1957. 9
Notice the word "exfoliation," chosen to describe a way of produc-
ing information not by the systematic process of study but by the
unsystematic "process of gradually exposing, layer by layer, inappropri-
ate or insufficient responses to the pollution problem, at each stage arriv-
ing at a better understanding of what to do next."10 By taking least steps
down the path of least resistance, officials "muddled through"11 and
"learned by doing"-usually by doing the wrong thing. Had the process
been more self-conscious, we could call it trial and error.
II
Plus qa change, plus c'est le meme chose. 12
Is the process I have just described a ubiquitous way of resolving
uncertainty in the policy process--any policy process? I happen to think
so, and others seem to agree, at least as to environmental policy,13 but I
wouldn't like to have to prove the thesis. Some years ago, in late 1977, I
presented my work on Los Angeles air pollution to a legal theory work-
shop at Yale Law School. The audience did not doubt that I had accu-
rately captured and convincingly (even conclusively) documented the
9. Id. at 293.
10. Id. at 289.
11. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79, 81 (1959) ("A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on the-
ory."); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517
(1979).
12. ALPHONSE KARR, LES Gue PEs (1849), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUO-
TATIONS 443 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (translation: The more things change, the
more things stay the same.).
13. See, eg., WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYAN, JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS
OF SCARCITY REVISITED 244-46 (1992).
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Los Angeles story, nor did it question my suggestion that much the same
could be said of a number of other cases of environmental policy making,
whether in the United States or abroad, that had by then been reported.
I was challenged by one participant, however, to "generalize" the idea of
exfoliation, to marshal the evidence for a global account, with global
meaning not only other countries but other problem contexts as well.
Having spent some half-dozen years on the Los Angeles epic alone, I had
no desire to devote the rest of my life to a massively larger project. But
my intuition was and still is that exfoliation, or muddling through, or
learning by doing, or trial and error, is pretty much the name of the
policy game, and necessarily so, thanks to stark limitations in human
cognitive capacities coupled with a scarcity of time, energy, and other
resources. Taken together, these drive us to proceed as we do, relying on
salient happenings to set priorities among the countless list of entries on
the agenda of social problems, working piecemeal and clumsily, traveling
the easy path, learning from mistakes that themselves make for more
salience, starting over, but not quite, because now we know a little bit
that we didn't know before.14
I believe that any reader who plants such a thought in his or her
mind as a working hypothesis will find it confirmed with frightening,
though actually unsurprising, regularity. I wish I had been gathering
cases in point all these years, rather than simply noting them and letting
them go. Unhappily, I have started doing so only lately, for purposes of
this Essay. I share a few instances now, just by way of little accounts
from the newspapers, because the events in question are well known.
(1) Brush fires are as familiar to Los Angeles as air pollution, and
seemingly as difficult to control. One would think that by now officials
would have the matter in hand, would have planned for the worst, would
have anticipated every path to disaster, and would have taken all feasible
steps, but it seems they have not. So the Ann Arbor News of November 3,
1993, reported this:
Interviewed this morning on ABC television, Interior Sec-
retary Bruce Babbitt said officials will need to examine laws on
building in canyons, perhaps requiring better brush clearance
and different zoning. "It's a tough problem and we obviously
14. On salience and related phenomena in the context being addressed, see Roger G. Noll
& James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychologyfor Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 747 (1990).
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have to figure out how to better manage it," he said in
Washington. 5
(2) Everybody knows about Florida's problems with foreign tour-
ists-actually, foreign tourists' problems with Florida-and officials have
taken every precaution they could think of. Unfortunately, they could
not think of them all, and a Mr. Colley was murdered at a highway rest
area:
Mr. Colley's death... was the second of a foreign tourist
in Florida in less than a week and the ninth since last October.
James T. Moore, director of the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement,... defended the security measures in place on
Florida highways before Mr. Colley was shot. "How many
places can we guard?" he asked. "We had no reason to think
we should deploy scarce resources at rest areas, because there
was not a problem there. Now there is a problem."1 6
Readers might think that these examples are unfairly critical. How
could officials be expected to anticipate with much precision the behavior
of the next breakout of fires, the next move of arsonists in Southern Cali-
fornia or the.next attack of muggers in Florida? But that's just my point:
They couldn't, any more than could the officials trying to cope with the
onset of air pollution in Los Angeles. The officials probably did the best
they could given what they knew and what they did not and what time
and resources they had available to devote to one of a host of pressing
tasks. And, doing the best they probably could, at least they learned
from experience (call it failure); they learned "there is a problem." Peo-
ple died, to be sure, but that's not the end of the world!
(3) Here is a final example, from the New York Times:
Global warming is not a cut and dried issue, and scientific
experts are still debating most of its aspects .... A substantial
number of highly regarded climate researchers have long be-
lieved that global warming set off by industrial and automotive
emissions is a real possibility that could have serious conse-
quences sooner or later. But they cannot say exactly how se-
vere the effects of the warming will be or when it will come.
15. Michael White, Fire Winds Bring Hell to Malibu, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Nov. 3, 1993, at
Al.
16. Larry Rohter, Florida, Fearing for Tourism, Offers Assurances on Safety, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 1993, at Al.
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And very few climatologists are ready to declare that global
warming has begun."7
III
A perfect illustration of the potential dangers of muddling
through is our approach to global warming. "
Whether it was speculation or experience that led to the first con-
cerns about global warming I am not sure. In any event, a far more
interesting question is whether speculation or experience will be the
prime mover behind global-warming policy from here on out (if there is
an out). And in this connection it appears that we are doing business
pretty much as usual, or so I gather from the account in the New York
Times about the global-warming debate. 9 On one side of the debate are
some environmentalists and politicians who warn "of climatic apoca-
lypse"; on the other side are those who argue that the likelihood of harm
from warming in the foreseeable future is "'ludicrously small,'" to use
the words of a 1993 book published by the Cato Institute.20 "In the
midst of this," asks the article in the New York Times, "whom is the
public to believe?... Are the chances of harm 'ludicrously small' or all
too great?"'"
Those are interesting questions, and one has to wonder how they
will be answered. Notice I focus on the "how" of the matter, not the
"what." Whatever the truth regarding global warming, a pressing con-
cern has to be whether it will be revealed chiefly by speculation, or
rather, and more characteristically, by experience. Here it is worthwhile
to quote from the New York Times at length:
There are two undisputed facts about global warming:
first, carbon dioxide, the waste gas produced by burning coal,
oil and wood, has been accumulating in the earth's atmosphere
over the last century; and second, the gas traps heat that is pro-
duced when the sun's energy is absorbed by the earth and then
re-radiated.
17. William K. Stevens, Scientists Confront Renewed Backlash on Global Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1993, at Cl.
18. OPHULS & BOYAN, supra note 13, at 245.
19. See Stevens, supra note 17.
20. Id at CI (quoting BEN W. BOLCH & ROBERT D. MCCALLUM, APOCALYPSE NOT:
SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENTALISM (1993)).
21. Id. (quoting BEN W. BOLCH & ROBERT D. MCCALLUM, APOCALYPSE NOT: SCI-
ENCE, ECONOMICS AND ENVIRONMENTALISM (1993)).
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Given those physical facts, the practical question of inter-
est is how much the earth's climate will heat up after injection
of a given amount of carbon dioxide. Since no experiment can
answer that question, other than the global one now in pro-
gress, scientists have turned to their next best method, which is
to simulate the earth's climate system in a series of equations
that are run on a supercomputer. This exercise, known as com-
puter modeling, is somewhat contentious because the models
are far from perfect and represent a simpler, stripped-down ver-
sion of the earth's real climate.22
The article goes on to say that the best computer models predict a
doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide by the year 2100, absent reme-
dial action; this in turn would raise average global temperature by about
the same amount again as the earth has warmed since the last Ice Age.
A United Nations panel and several committees of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences have consistenly found merit in the global-warming the-
ory, which has also enjoyed some recent empirical support: Geological
evidence of carbon dioxide levels in two ancient climates, one known to
be much warmer than today's and the other much colder, suggests a rela-
tionship betweeen warming and carbon dioxide levels that "agrees well
with the best estimate from the computer models."23
Critics nevertheless attack the theory and the predictions on a vari-
ety of grounds, such as poor measurements, counter-evidence, and the
possibility that the climate may behave differently now than it did in the
remote past. The critics also enter a plea in the alternative, much as did
the auto companies in the Los Angeles air pollution story. The auto
companies claimed, in essence, that motor vehicles weren't a problem,
and that if they were they weren't a big problem, and that if they were
the companies could not yet do anything about it.24 So, on the question
of global warming, "[s]ome critics contend that even if the atmosphere
does heat up, the warming will be benign, . . . a boon, not a
catastrophe."
'25
"Where," asks the New York Times, "does all this leave the de-
bate?"26 I worry that it leaves it up in the air (no pun), where it will
remain until some climactic event brings the problem to earth. As with
Southern California's air pollution problem some fifty years earlier, it
22. Id.
23. Id. at C6.
24. See KRIER & URSIN, supra note 3, at 86-89, 259-60.
25. Stevens, supra note 17, at C6.
26. Id.
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appears now, in the case of global warming, that speculation is not pro-
viding sufficient salience to move policy along. This in turn implies that
global-warming policy might instead have to develop through a process
of exfoliation.
The trouble is that that process does not seem to fit this problem. It
did fit the other problems I have discussed-pollution and fires in South-
ern California, tourist muggings in Florida-primarily because those
were local problems. Localization helped to contain error costs; mis-
takes exacted a painful but tolerable price in exchange for what was
learned. But will this be true as well of global warming and ozone deple-
tion and toxic chemicals and the destruction of ocean fisheries and tropi-
cal rain forests? I am not saying that in instances like these, mistakes
will mean the end of the world. They might, however, mark the end of
an era, the end of a long, long period during which we could afford to
rely on experience to guide us through uncertainty.
In the past the world reported back, and so it will in the future, but
at what price? And will the feedback we get from the world be timely
and useful, or too much and too late? The end of the world is not the
point. The end of the world news is.
IV
The human species is, in a word, an environmental abnormality.
It is possible that intelligence in the wrong kind of species was
foreordained to be a fatal combination for the biosphere. Per-
haps a law of evolution is that intelligence usually extinguishes
itself 2
7
In his famous article on social cost, Ronald Coase referred to air
pollution as "the smoke nuisance."28 This was only thirty-some years
ago, and yet in that space of a single generation our sense of environmen-
tal problems has changed dramatically, as the term "global" itself sug-
gests. Lynn White, Jr., a medieval historian, puts the matter this way:
[T]he impact of our race upon the environment has so in-
creased in force that it has changed in essence. When the first
cannons were fired, in the early 14th century, they affected
ecology by sending workers scrambling to the forests and
mountains for more potash, sulfur, iron ore, and charcoal, with
27. Edward 0. Wilson, Is Humanity Suicidal?, N.Y. TIMEs MAGAZINE, May 30, 1993, at
24, 26.
28. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960).
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some resulting erosion and deforestation. Hydrogen bombs are
of a different order: A war fought with them might alter the
genetics of all life on this planet. By 1285 London had a smog
problem arising from the burning of soft coal, but our present
combustion of fossil fuels threatens to change the chemistry of
the globe's atmosphere as a whole, with consequences that we
are only beginning to guess.
29
The sociobiologist Edward 0. Wilson sees the same transformation. He
speaks of a "long stretch of evolutionary time, during which [little atten-
tion had to be paid to] ... [d]isasters of a magnitude that occur only once
every few centuries"; these could be, and were, "forgotten or transmuted
into myth."' 30 But, says Wilson, the "rules have recently changed," such
that "[gIlobal crises are rising within the life span of the generation now
,"31coming of age ....
Wilson has in mind a familiar list of problems (interestingly, it is a
much longer list than that of White, who wrote a quarter century ear-
lier): population growth and accompanying resource scarcity, ozone de-
pletion, global warming, and, most generally but also most particularly,
massive extinction of habitats and species. "The ongoing loss" of bio-
sphere, he reports, "will not be replaced by evolution in any period of
time that has meaning for humanity. '32 Evolution, in fact, has been a
kind of enemy; it may be "that people are programmed by their genetic
heritage to be so selfish that a sense of global responsibility will come too
late."' 33 As Wilson explains this view,
The brain evolved into its present form during [a] long stretch
of evolutionary time, during which people existed in small, pre-
literate hunter-gatherer bands. Life was precarious and short.
A premium was placed on close attention to the near future and
early reproduction, and little else .... So today the mind still
works comfortably backward and forward only for a few years,
spanning a period not exceeding one or two generations. Those
in past ages whose genes inclined them to short-term thinking
lived longer and had more children than those who did not.
Prophets never enjoyed a Darwinian edge.34
For all of this, Wilson sees "reasons for optimism":
29. Lynn White, Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 Sci. 1203, 1203-04
(1967).
30. Wilson, supra note 27, at 26.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 26.
34. Id.
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We are smart enough and have time enough to avoid an envi-
ronmental catastrophe of civilization-threatening dimensions.
But the technical problems are sufficiently formidable to re-
quire a redirection of much of science and technology, and the
ethical issues are so basic as to force a reconsideration of our
self-image as a species."5
Not easy matters, those, and notice in any event that Wilson's opti-
mism-based largely, though not entirely, on his view that we are enter-
ing the "Century of the Environment," marked already by a Rio
Conference, a "Warning to Humanity" issued by an international group
of scientists, and a "greening of religion"-entails not a happy future but
rather just a future. The end of the world is not necessarily at hand, and
mankind is not "suicidal." "Yet the awful truth remains that a large part
of humanity will suffer no matter what is done."36
What exactly are the central characteristics of the new environmen-
tal problems, problems that have moved an intelligent man to connect
unavoidable calamity with a word, "optimism," that we usually regard as
upbeat?
All of them can be aptly expressed in terms of scale-spatial, tempo-
ral, and consequential. Regarding the first dimension, modern environ-
mental problems are commonly global, not local or even national as
before; they are large-scale problems. As to the second dimension, time,
modem problems are marked by both contraction and expansion-con-
traction because ongoing exponential growth in both a huge population
and a huge technological base increases the rate at which problems de-
velop,37 and expansion because of long latency periods in some instances
and long recovery periods in others. Long latency time is typical of
many cancers; thirty years might stand between a toxic chemical dose
and a malignant tumor response. As to long recovery time, a good exam-
ple is global warming: "[W]hatever climatic effect it has will not be re-
versed in several human lifetimes."38 The third dimension has to do with
worst cases, which could be, as Wilson has indicated, catastrophic, essen-
tially irreversible, and-to get back to where we began-worldwide in
their impact.
These characteristics are interesting for any number of reasons, the
most important, for present purposes, having to do with the exfoliation
35. Id. at 27.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 26-27.
38. Stevens, supra note 17, at C6; see also supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing
lengthy replacement time for loss of biosphere).
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process, or trial-and-error decision making. "The reactive technique of
trial-and-error is useful only to the extent that information generated by
one (successful or unsuccessful) experiment can be considered and ex-
ploited in a subsequent one."39 The trouble is that with many present-
day environmental problems,
the potential to learn from error is simultaneously the potential
to bring about catastrophic consequences. Errors might in any
event be of little educational value, thanks to latency. Latency
means that what we learn, we learn late. This promotes irre-
versibility and limits opportunities to correct mistakes through
a relatively quick series of many trials."
How are we to proceed in dealing with very risky, very uncertain
situations, situations that defy the convention of muddling through? The
standard advice is "prudence." In a case like global warming, for exam-
ple, "lack of certainty should not stand in the way of prudent steps to
control greenhouse gas emissions."41 But "prudence"-or, to use an-
other watchword of the day, "precaution"-is not so easy to identify and
achieve, given the very high stakes of modern environmental ills. Take
again the case of global warming. The National Resource Council says
that "despite the great uncertainties, greenhouse warming is a potential
threat sufficient to justify action now."'4 2 True, but as the account in the
New York Times observes, "How much action, what kind and how soon
is an economic and political issue of great consequence in a world that
runs on the burning of fossil fuels."4 In other words, given the conse-
quences of any decision regarding global warming, what really is the pru-
dent course?
In an article written some years ago, Jon Elster addressed this ques-
tion in a context almost identical to ours, his purpose being "to illumi-
nate the structure of the choice between alternative modes of energy
production that most Western societies face at the present time."'  Ob-
39. Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. RE'.
1027, 1107 (1990).
40. Id. Notice in addition that latency frustrates the chances of natural selection to iden-
tify reliable prophets; by the time we learn some forecaster was wrong, the forecaster is long
gone. Id. at 1108. For additional discussion of the general points made in the text, see James
E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 405, 427-28 (1985).
41. Stevens, supra note 17, at C6.
42. Id.
43. Id. On the same page, Stevens concludes his story: "Proponents of the greenhouse
theory therefore need not be surprised at the intense fire now being rained down on their
ideas." Id.
44. Jon Elster, Risk, Uncertainty and Nuclear Power, 18 Soc. ScI. INFo. 371, 371 (1979).
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serving that it is impossible to know what will actually happen in the
world if we choose nuclear over conventional fossil fuel, he argues that
our objective--given the gross uncertainty-should not be to maximize
expected utility but rather to maximize minimal utility, which is to say
minimize regret by avoiding the worst worst case. Thus analyzing the
matter, he concludes that "nuclear power has the worst worst-conse-
quence"45 (global nuclear war), "that fossil power has a somewhat better
worst-consequence" 46 (reversible or at least arrestable heating of the at-
mosphere), and that the "best worst-consequence belongs to an option
that at present looks politically impossible, the no-growth economy."
4 7
Elster was writing in 1979, when things looked rather different than
they do today. A no-growth economy is no more likely now than it was
then (probably it is less so), but the threat of nuclear war is arguably less,
and, most to the point, the assumption of reversible global heating now
appears to have been too easily made. In essence, then, Elster managed
to beg our question away. The worst-case alternatives he saw as asym-
metrical fifteen years ago look symmetrical today.4" So how do we pick
the prudent path, other than by trial and error?
V
If this be error, and upon me proved, I never writ.... 4 9
As much as any analyst hopes to be right, I hope to be wrong, and
well I could be in various respects: Perhaps the costs of global errors will
not be so high as I and others (like White and Wilson) worry they might
be; or not so symmetrical in the context of opposing worst-case conse-
quences, such that prudent courses of action can in fact be identified; or
maybe exfoliation is not as ubiquitous as it seems to me it is; or even if it
is, presumably this could change; or something else. It might be, for
example, that I have committed an error of my own, a category mistake.
Perhapsplus ga change is more apt than I have supposed, and today's ills
45. Id. at 389.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 390.
48. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON
THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 21-23 (1983) (commenting
on Elster's analysis); James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 781, 786-89 (1990)
(discussing symmetry problem). In this same connection, it is interesting to compare Jonathan
Schell's description of a postnuclear-war world, SCHELL, supra note 2, with E.O. Wilson's
description of a postenvironmental-catastrophe world, Wilson, supra note 27. They sound the
same. In any event, Elster thinks that "politicians may not be much swayed by considera-
tions" of the sort he discusses. Elster, supra note 44, at 393.
49. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, SONNET 116.
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are really no worse, after all, than what yesteryear's were incorrectly
thought to be. A case in point is the crossbow, a weapon whose power
was so frightening that it was banned by the Roman Catholic Church in
1139, except for use against infidels.5 0 Now the Catholic Bishops ban the
bomb, at least for use against cities.5" Nuclear weapons today, crossbows
long ago, it's all the same. Plus qa change, and so on.
I hope so, because otherwise I see neither solace nor substitute for
the end of the world news. We could proceed to make policy by the
equivalent of a coin flip, on the principle of insufficient reason, but it
seems bizarre to let random luck decide our destiny (which of itself pro-
vides a sufficient reason to do otherwise). We could turn to mystery and
ritual, as did our distant ancestors-could if we had not already. The
primitives had shamans, which we call risk assessors; they had totems,
and we have science, progress, and technological wonders; they had
taboos, but so do we;52 and despite all of these we still have our modem
predicament.
Or might we instead hope for healthy norms to develop, norms by
which all would behave more kindly toward each other and the globe?
On one account such norms are provoked by salience,53 and on another
account they depend on small, tightly knit groups. 4 But salience is what
we want norms to avoid, and small groups imply local action, which in
turn implies massive externalization, only assuring that problems will be
made global rather than contained. Think global/act local is a nice senti-
ment, but not a nice solution. Think local/act local is the more likely
outcome.
So I hope I am wrong, but if I am not, I hardly expect anyone to
notice. My self-indulgent footnotes are meant to indicate that I have said
before virtually all that I've said here. Yet I know from casual polling
that readers of my work, even students of it, have simply not seen the
argument. It is one thing to disagree, another not to see. Have I been
obscure? I think not. I think the problem is that I have no solution
50. See BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR: THE CALAMITOUS 14TH CEN-
TURY 86 (1978); Lynn White, Jr., Technology Assessment from the Stance of a Medieval Histo-
rian, 79 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 5 (1974). For an argument that the ban on crossbows was
motivated by other than moral concerns, see JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADI-
TION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 124-31 (1981).
51. See JONATHAN SCHELL, THE ABOLITION 80 (1986).
52. See, e.g., DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 48, passim.
53. KRIER & URSIN, supra note 3, at 269-72.
54. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DIS-
PUTES passim (1991).
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ready at hand, so cognitive dissonance sets in. (This Essay should be the
acid test of that proposition!)
In any event, the paradox of my position is apparent, for what I do
is speculate and theorize about the limits of theory and speculation. By
my own account, only experience will drive the point home, whatever the
point happens to be. "Experience gives us facts," writes Jonathan Schell,
"whereas in pure speculation we are thrown back on theory, which has
never been a very reliable guide to future events.""5 According to this I
am probably right, and therefore most likely wrong.
55. SCHELL, supra note 2, at 21.
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